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Abstract
Coarse correlated equilibria (CCE, Moulin and Vial, 1978) can be used to substantially improve
upon the Nash equilibrium solution of the well-analysed abatement game (Barrett, 1994). We show
this by computing successively the CCE with the largest total utility, the one with the highest
possible abatement levels and finally, the one with maximal abatement level while maintaining at
least the level of utility from the Nash outcome.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Mediated communication is a true and tested way to achieve incentive-compatible coordination on
efficient outcomes in many non-cooperative games. Surely, the most influential among such schemes
in the literature is correlated equilibrium (CE), as proposed by Aumann (1974, 1987). We note that
applications of CE and related concepts to economic modeling have been few and far between; we here
offer a modest step towards filling this obvious gap.
We focus on the simplest version of the very popular game of environmental-abatement, introduced
by Barrett (1994), in which two agents (two countries or two firms) choose how much to abate that
involves a personal (abatement) cost but the total abatement does generate a benefit to both agents.1
To keep computations tractable, we postulate a symmetric two-person game with quadratic utilities,
where the Nash equilibrium outcome is inefficient however cannot be improved by any CE outcome,
because we are in a potential game, where the unique Nash equilibrium is known to be the only CE
(Liu (1996), Neyman (1997), Yi (1997) and Ui (2008)).
We instead examine the performance of coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE), a less-demanding vari-
ant of CE, introduced in Moulin and Vial (1978), in our abatement game. In a CCE, a (fictitious)
mediator asks the players, before running a lottery (a correlation device), to either commit to the future
outcome of the lottery or to play any strategy of their own without learning anything about the outcome
of the lottery. The equilibrium property is that each player finds it optimal to commit ex ante to use
the strategy selected by the lottery.2
In the context of climate change negotiation, in particular for the abatement game, a (coarse)
correlation device can be interpreted as an independent agency working with all relevant countries
towards the ultimate goal of global emission reduction. In a CCE of the abatement game, each country
remains free to revert to a non-cooperative emission, but does not benefit from doing so as long as other
countries commit to the policy selected by the agency.3
1Several non-cooperative as well as cooperative solutions have already been analysed for this abatement game, such
as, Barrett (2001), Finus (2003), McGinty (2007), Rubio and Ulph (2006). To the best of our knowledge, in the whole
literature on game theoretic applications in environmental economics, correlation has been mostly ignored, with the
possible exceptions of Forgo´, Fu¨lo¨p and Prill (2005) and Forgo´ (2011) who used (modified versions of) CE in other
environmental games. Baliga and Maskin (2003) surveyed some models of mechanisms in this literature.
2In their paper, Moulin and Vial (1978) called this equilibrium concept a correlation scheme. Young (2004) and
Roughgarden (2009) introduced the terminology of coarse correlated equilibrium that was later adopted by Ray and Sen
Gupta (2013) and Moulin et al. (2014), while Forgo´ (2010) called it a weak correlated equilibrium.
3The randomisation device in a CCE can be seen as mediating institutions like government agencies, international
bodies (as analysed in Arce (1995), Arce (1997) and Awaya and Krishna (2018), for example), such as European Union
(EU), World Trade Organisation (WTO), United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) who can
provide recommendations to all the signatories towards the ultimate goal of global emission reduction (see, for example,
Forgo et al. (2005), Forgo (2010), Forgo (2011) and Slechten (2013)).
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We first build on results of Moulin et al. (2014), who showed, in a more general class of quadratic
symmetric two-person games, how coarse correlation can improve the efficiency of the Nash outcome,
that is, raise the common utility of the two agents in such a game. We thus have characterised the best,
in terms of payoffs, CCE (that turns out to be just a 50 − 50 lottery over two outcomes, as in Moulin
et al. (2014)) for our abatement game.4
Undoubtedly, in the environmental game we study here, the improvement of the polluters’ welfare
is only one of many normative goals of interest; however perhaps more important is the social concern
for reducing the total level of physical pollution, i. e., increasing the (equilibrium) abatement levels.
Not surprisingly, there is a tension between these two goals: the optimal CCE (in terms of payoffs) may
not provide the optimal abatement level; on the other hand, we observe that the abatement-maximising
CCE may generate low, even well below the Nash, payoffs.
For example, consider a baseline abatement game in which the utility of agent i is given by the
function q − bq2 − cq2i , where qi is the choice of abatement level by agent i and thus q (= q1 + q2) is
the total abatement, with the benefit and cost parameters, respectively, b = 2 and c = 1. One can show
that for this game, the optimal CCE (total) payoff is piCCE = 23104 ≈ 0.2211, while the Nash (total)
payoff is piN = 1150 ≈ 0.22 and hence, pi
CCE
piN
≈ 1.0052 (an improvement over the Nash payoff by 0.5%,
which seems small but can be a significant amount if one thinks of real-life magnitudes); in this case,
qCCE
qN
≈ 1.057, an improvement over the Nash abatement by 5.7%. If one wished to maximise just the
abatement level, then the best possible scenario would have been associated with another similar lottery
for which q
CCE
qN
≈ 1.53, i.e., 53% improvement over the Nash abatement level; however, the associated
payoff falls by about 35% from the Nash payoff level. Of course, one may now ask what if we wish to
achieve at least the Nash payoff while maximising the abatement level; the answer (for this baseline
game) is that we can have a maximum of 11.5% improvement in the abatement maintaining such a
restriction, with a payoff just above (0.05% more than) the Nash payoff.
Keeping this tug-of-war spirit in mind, we, in this paper, prove three general results for our abatement
game, by computing successively: 1. the most efficient (in terms of payoffs) symmetric CCE (irrespective
of abatement levels); 2. the CCE with the maximal abatement level (that may force the players’ utilities
below their Nash equilibrium levels) and 3.the CCE with the largest abatement level among the ones
maintaining (at least) the Nash equilibrium utility level. Our answers are indeed in closed forms; these
are illustrated using the above baseline game, based on the (ratio of) the cost and the benefit parameters.
4Note that the class of public good provision (as analysed in Moulin et al. (2014)) and that of the abatement game
differ only in the cost term which is linear there and quadratic here, however this difference changes the entire analysis;
for instance, in the public good provision game, the support of the optimal CCE is on the axis, which never happens here.
3
2 MODEL
We first present here the notations and definitions used in Moulin et al. (2014), for the sake of consistency
and completeness.
2.1 Coarse Correlated Equilibrium
Consider a two-person normal form game, G = [X1, X2;u1, u2], where the strategy sets, X1 and X2,
are closed real intervals and the payoff functions ui : X1 × X2 → R, i = 1, 2, are continuous. We
write C(X1×X2) for the set of such continuous functions and similarly, C(Xi) for the set of continuous
functions on Xi.
Let L(X1 × X2) with generic element L and L(Xi) with generic element `i denote the sets of
probability measures on X1 ×X2 and Xi respectively. Let the mean of ui(x1, x2) with respect to L be
denoted by ui(L).
The deterministic distribution at z is denoted by δz, and for product distributions such as δx1 ⊗ `2
we write ui(δx1 ⊗ `2) simply as ui(x1, `2).
Given L ∈ L(X1 × X2), we write Li for the marginal distribution of L on Xi, defined as follows:
∀f ∈ C(Xi), f(Li) = f∗(L), where f∗(x1, x2) = f(x1) for all x1, x2 ∈ X1 ×X2.
Definition 1 A coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) of the game G is a lottery L ∈ L(X1 ×X2) such
that u1(L) ≥ u1(x1, L2) and u2(L) ≥ u2(L1, x2) for all (x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2.
2.2 Abatement Game
We present below the model proposed in Barrett (1994) with two agents (n = 2).
The payoff function of an agent is a function of the abatement level chosen by both agents q1
and q2. Let us write the total abatement as q (q = q1 + q2) and the benefit function of agent i as
Bi(q) =
B
2 (Aq − q
2
2 ). The cost function of each agent is a function of its own abatement level qi and is
given as Ci(qi) =
Cq2i
2 . The payoff function of agent i is thus given by ui(q1, q2) =
ABq
2 − Bq
2
4 − Cq
2
i
2 ,
where A, B and C are all positive.5
For our purposes, we now call a = AB2 , b =
B
4 , c =
C
2 with the assumption that a > 0, b > 0 and
c ≥ 0; we also set the ratio r = cb with 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. The above payoff function can then be written as:
u1(q1, q2) = aq − bq2 − cq21 ; u2(q1, q2) = u1(q2, q1).
We call the above game an abatement game in the rest of this paper.
Given q2, the best response of agent 1 (symmetrically, for agent 2) is BR1(q2) =
∂u1(q1,q2)
∂q1
=
a− 2bq − 2cq1. Thus, the Nash equilibrium (qN1 , qN2 ) is given by qN1 = qN2 = a2(2b+c) ; the corresponding
5Note that the benefit function in the published version of Barrett (1994) has a typo that we have corrected here.
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total abatement qN and total payoff piN are given by qN = ab
1
(2+r) and pi
N = a
2
2b
(4+3r)
(2+r)2 .
One may compute the efficient abatement levels (qeff1 , q
eff
2 ) by maximising the total payoff u1(q1, q2)+
u2(q1, q2) = 2aq − 2bq2 − c(q21 + q22); using q1 = q2, it is easy to prove that qeff1 = qeff2 = a4b+c with
pieff = 2a
2
4b+c =
a2
b
2
4+r .
As is well-known, the abatement game is a potential game with the potential function P (q1, q2) =
aq − bq2 − c(q21 + q22), which is smooth and concave. Therefore, the only correlated equilibrium is the
Nash equilibrium qN . One can however use CCE for this game to improve upon the Nash equilibrium.
We borrow the characterization of the CCEs in the more general class of quadratic symmetric two-
person games in Moulin et al. (2014), as our game here is a special instance in that class.
The equilibrium condition in Definition 1 translates to a condition linking the three moments of
L. If lottery L is the distribution of the symmetric random variable (Z1, Z2), these moments are the
expected values of Zi, Z
2
i , and Z1 · Z2 that we denote by α, β and γ, where α = EL[Z1], β = EL[Z21 ]
and γ = EL[Z1 · Z2].
Proposition 1 A symmetric lottery L ∈ Lsy(R2+) is a CCE of the abatement game if and only if
maxz≥0{(a − 2bα)z − (b + c)z2} ≤ aα − (b + c)β − 2bγ. The corresponding utility (for an agent i) is
ui(L) = 2aα− (2b+ c)β − 2bγ.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. We now state a couple of technical Lemmata that
will be used in our main results. The first is due to Moulin et al. (2014). It identifies the range of the
vector (α, β, γ) when L ∈ Lsy(R2+) and also shows that this range is covered by two families of very
simple lotteries with at most four strategy profiles in their support.
Let L∗ be the subset of Lsy(R2+) containing the simple lotteries of the form L = q2 (δz,z + δz′,z′) +
p
2 (δz,z′ + δz′,z), where z, z
′, q and p are non-negative and q + p = 1. Let L∗∗ be the subset of Lsy(R2+)
of the form L = q · δz,z + q′ · δ0,0 + p2 (δ0,z + δz,0), where z, q, q′ and p are non-negative and q+ q′+p = 1.
Lemma 1 i) For any L ∈ Lsy(R2+) and the corresponding random variable (Z1, Z2), α, γ ≥ 0; β ≥ γ;
β + γ ≥ 2α2;
ii) Equality β = γ in i) holds if and only if L is diagonal: Z1 = Z2 (a.e.);
iii) Equality β + γ = 2α2 in i) holds if and only if L is anti-diagonal: Z1 + Z2 is constant (a.e.);
iv) For any (α, β, γ) ∈ R3+ satisfying inequalities in i), there exists L ∈ L∗ ∪L∗∗ with precisely these
parameters.
Note that Lemma 1 implies β ≥ α2, with equality β = α2 if and only if L is deterministic, because
β = α2 implies both β = γ and β + γ = 2α2. The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Moulin et al.
(2014) and thus is omitted here.
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For a given lottery L with the parameters α, β, γ the corresponding (total) abatement level is qL = 2α.
Now, we observe the following.
Lemma 2 A lottery L(α, β, γ) is a CCE if and only if
either α >
a
2b
and aα ≥ (b+ c)β + 2bγ
or α ≤ a
2b
and aα ≥ (b+ c)β + 2bγ + 1
4
(a− 2bα)2
b+ c
.
The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward, developing the statement in Proposition 1 and thus is
omitted.
Remark 1 Given Lemma 1, the first case (involving case α > a2b) in Lemma 2 is impossible. This can
be shown easily by fixing α and considering the two conditions on the vector (β, γ), namely, β+γ ≥ 2α2
(from Lemma 1) and aα ≥ (b+ c)β + 2bγ; note that the line (b+ c)β + 2bγ = aα is flatter than the line
β+ γ = 2α2 in the (β, γ)-plane and therefore, the two corresponding half-spaces intersect in the positive
orthant if and only if aαb+c ≥ 2α2 which contradicts α > a2b .
3 RESULTS
3.1 Payoff-maximising CCE
The focus of this section is CCEs that maximize the total payoff u1 + u2. Recall that the baseline
example in the Introduction illustrates a CCE which achieves a higher payoff compared to the Nash
equilibrium. We will now provide the formal result that forms the basis for this example.
First, as the abatement game is symmetric, we can limit our search to symmetric lotteries L only
(as explained in Moulin et al. (2014), when one identifies an optimal symmetric CCE, one also captures
an optimal CCE among all CCEs, symmetric or otherwise). We denote the set of symmetric lotteries
by Lsy(R2+). The following result characterises the payoff-maximising CCE for the abatement game.
Proposition 2 i) If b ≤ c, the Nash equilibrium of the abatement game is its only CCE.
ii) If b > c, the optimal values of the three moments of the payoff-maximising L, L˜, are given by
(α˜, β˜, γ˜):
α˜ =
a
b
2 + 2r − r2
2(4 + 5r)
,
β˜ =
a2
b2
4 + 8r + r2 − 4r3
4(4 + 5r)2
and γ˜ =
a2
b2
4 + 8r − r2 − 4r3 + 2r4
4(4 + 5r)2
;
while the optimal CCE is L˜ = 12δ(z,z′) +
1
2δ(z′,z), with
z, z′ =
a
b
2 + 2r − r2 ± r√1− r2
2(4 + 5r)
.
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Lemma 3 below states a two-step algorithm to find the payoff-maximising CCEs using Lemma 1 and
Proposition 1.
Lemma 3 Given the abatement game, the following nested programmes generate the payoff-maximising
CCEs:
Step 1: Fix α non-negative, and solve the linear programme
min
β,γ
{(2b+ c)β + 2bγ} under constraints
β ≥ γ ≥ 0; β + γ ≥ 2α2; (b+ c)β + 2bγ ≤ aα−max
z≥0
{(a− 2bα)z − (b+ c)z2}.
Step 2: With the solutions β(α), γ(α) found in Step 1, solve
max
α
{2aα− (2b+ c)β(α)− 2bγ(α)} under constraints
α ≥ 0; max
z≥0
{(a− 2bα)z − (b+ c)z2} ≤ aα− (b+ c)β(α)− 2bγ(α).
Moreover, there is a payoff-maximising CCE in L∗ ∪ L∗∗.
Lemma 3 is similar to Theorem 1 in Moulin et al. (2014) and hence the proof is omitted here. The
rest of the proof of Proposition 2 is postponed to the Appendix.
Remark 2 Using Proposition 2, one can easily compute the maximum payoff obtained by the CCE
L˜ (when b > c); the payoff of agent i at L˜ is ui(L˜) =
1
b2−c2 [
a2
b2
(2+2r−r2)2
4(4+5r) − a
2c
4b2 ] =
a2
b
4+4r−r2
4(4+5r) . The
computation is straightforward and hence is omitted.
Remark 3 Observe that from Proposition 2, the ratio q
CCE
qN
for payoff-maximizing CCE is equal to
(2+2r−r2)(2+r)
(4+5r) which is a concave function when r is between 0 and 1 with its maximum achieved close
to r = 12 (≈ 0.489 to be more specific).
3.1.1 Baseline example
We now illustrate Proposition 2 by revisiting the example in the Introduction more formally.
Consider an abatement game with a = 1, b = 2 and c = 1 ; hence, r = cb =
1
2 < 1 and the payoff
function is given by ui(q1, q2) = q − 2q2 − q2i , with Nash equilibrium (total) abatement level, qN = 15 .
From Proposition 2, the payoff-maximising CCE corresponds to the optimal values of the moments:
α˜ = 11104 ≈ 0.1057, β˜ = 312704 ≈ 0.0114 and γ˜ = 595408 ≈ 0.0109. The optimal CCE is the lottery L˜ =
1
2δ(z,z′) +
1
2δ(z′,z), where z, z
′ = 11±
√
3
104 , that chooses two outcomes (
11+
√
3
104 ,
11−√3
104 ) and (
11−√3
104 ,
11+
√
3
104 )
each with probability 12 .
The corresponding expected payoff (for one agent) derived by playing this CCE is ui(L˜) =
299
2704 ≈
0.1105. The optimal CCE (total) payoff is piCCE = 2ui(L˜) =
23
104 ≈ 0.2211, while the Nash equilibrium
(total) payoff is piN = 1150 ≈ 0.22. We have pi
CCE
piN
= 575572 ≈ 1.0052 and q
CCE
qN
≈ 1.057. The CCE in this
case improves over the Nash payoff by 0.5% and over the Nash abatement by 5.7%.
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3.2 Abatement-maximising CCE
Remark 3 shows that both utility and abatement levels are improved (from the Nash outcome) in a
payoff maximizing CCE. However, the interesting question from abatement point of view is, is this (also)
the best abatement improvement possible over Nash abatement? The answer is no as shown by our
next result, Proposition 3, characterizing abatement maximizing CCEs which achieves an abatement
improvement of as much as 150%.
First, for convenience, we adopt the following notational simplification:
α =
a
b
α′, β =
a2
b2
β′ and γ =
a2
b2
γ′.
Using this new notation, our main result of this subsection is the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 For a fixed r < 1, the optimal values of the three moments of the optimal abatement
maximising CCE are α′ = 1
2(2+r−√1−r2) , β
′ = 2α′2 and γ′ = 0; the optimal lottery is L∗(r) = 12δ(z,z′) +
1
2δ(z′,z), with z, z
′ = 1
(2+r−√1−r2) .
To prove Proposition 3, we will need the following supporting lemma.
Observe that the CCE lotteries L(r) correspond to triples (α′, β′, γ′) satisfying β′ ≥ γ′ ≥ 0, α′ ≥ 0
and β′ + γ′ ≥ 2α′2, α′ ≤ 12 and
(1 + r)β′ + 2γ′ ≤ α′ − (1− 2α
′)2
4(1 + r)
=
1
1 + r
((2 + r)α′ − α′2 − 1
4
).
We then ask for which values of the positive α′, r and ∆, we can find non-negative parameters β′, γ′
such that β′ ≥ γ′ ≥ 0, β′ + γ′ ≥ 2α′2 and (1 + r)β′ + 2γ′ ≤ ∆.
As the latter line is flatter than the former one, we see (in the (β, γ)-plane) that it is possible if and
only if 11+r∆ ≥ 2α′2 ⇐⇒ (2(1 + r)2 + 1)α′2 − (2 + r)α′ + 14 ≤ 0.
This observation leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Given α′ > 0, there exist β′, γ′ such that L(α′, β′, γ′) is a CCE if and only if α′ ≤ 12
and (2(1 + r)2 + 1)α′2 − (2 + r)α′ + 14 ≤ 0. The corresponding relative abatement level is given by
qL
qN
= 2(2 + r)α′.
The proof of Lemma 4 follows directly from the above arguments. The proof of Proposition 3 is in
the Appendix that uses Lemmata 2 and 4.
3.2.1 Baseline example contd.
We revisit our baseline example and illustrate Proposition 3. The abatement-maximising CCE has the
associated values of α, β and γ as follows: α = 0.153, β = .049 and γ = 0. The corresponding expected
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payoff (for one agent) derived by playing this CCE is ui(L) ≈ 0.0719. The optimal CCE (total) payoff
is piCCE = 2ui(L) ≈ 0.1438, while the Nash equilibrium (total) payoff is piN ≈ 0.22. We thus have
piCCE
piN
≈ 0.653 and qCCE
qN
≈ 1.53. The CCE in this case improves over the Nash abatement by 53% but
has less payoff compared to the Nash outcome.
3.2.2 Comments
The relative gain in total abatement level at L∗(r) is q
L∗(r)
qN
= 2+r
2+r−√1−r2 which decreases in r from 2
(at r = 0) to 1 at (r = 1). The total payoff at L∗(r) is
uL
∗(r) = 2
a2
b
(2α− (2 + r)β − 2γ) =a
2
b
2α(2− (2 + r)2α) =a
2
b
2 + r − 2√1− r2
(2 + r −√1− r2)2
=⇒ uL∗(r) = a
2
b
1
2 + r −√1− r2 (2−
qL
∗(r)
qN
)
So, uL
∗(r) starts at 0 for r = 0 and is increasing in r. Therefore,
uL
∗(r)
uN
= 2
(2 + r)2(2 + r − 2√1− r2)
(4 + 3r)(2 + r −√1− r2)2
increases from 0 (at r = 0) to 67 (at ` = 1).
Using the baseline example, at r = 12 , we find
qL(
1
2
)
qN
' 150% and uL(
1
2
)
uN
' 67%. This implies that
the CCE corresponding to the optimal abatement level always achieves a payoff which is lower than the
Nash payoff. This is in contrast with the payoff-maximising CCE that also improves upon the Nash
abatement levels (although, they are far from the optimal abatement levels). This clearly shows the
conflicting nature of these measures, and thereby leads us to our analysis in the next subsection.
3.3 Abatement vs. Payoff
We first impose the additional constraint on L(α′, β′, γ′)
2(2α′ − (2 + r)β′ − 2γ′) ≥ 4 + 3r
2(2 + r)2
⇐⇒ (2 + r)β′ + 2γ′ ≤ 2α′ − 4 + 3r
4(2 + r)2
(1)
Recalling the earlier constraints
(1 + r)β′ + 2γ′ ≤ 1
1 + r
((2 + r)α′ − α′2 − 1
4
) (2)
β′ ≥ γ′ ≥ 0 and β′ + γ′ ≥ 2α′2 (3)
We now fix α′ and look for β′, γ′ meeting (3) and below the lines Γ1 given by (1) and Γ2 given by (2).
As Γ1 is steeper than the diagonal β
′ + γ′ = 2α′2 while Γ2 is flatter than this diagonal (see Figure 1),
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γ′
β′
Γ2Γ1
Figure 1: Feasible region of abatement maximizing CCEs subject to utility constraint.
we get that, for any fixed α′, the existence of a solution β′, γ′ to this system is equivalent to the fact
that the point β′ = γ′ = α′2 is below Γ1 while the intersection of Γ1 and Γ2 is above the diagonal.
The former constraint is:
(4 + r)α′2 − 2α′ + 4 + 3r
4(2 + r)2
≤ 0 (4)
For the second one, we compute first the intersection β′∗, γ′∗ of Γ1 and Γ2. Straightforward computations
give:
β′∗ =
1
1 + r
(rα′ + α′2 − r(3 + 2r)
4(2 + r)2
); γ′∗ =
1
2(1 + r)
((2− r2)α′ − (2 + r)α′2 − 4 + r − 4r
2 − 2r3
4(2 + r)2
) (5)
Hence, the additional constraint on α′ is
1
2(1 + r)
((2 + 2r − r2)α′ − rα′2 − 4 + 7r − 2r
3
4(2 + r)2
) ≥ 2α′2
⇐⇒ (4 + 5r)α′2 − (2 + 2r − r2)α′ + 4 + 7r − 2r
3
4(2 + r)2
≤ 0 (6)
The two roots of the equation derived from (4) are 12(2+r) and
4+3r
2(2+r)(4+r) , while the two roots of the
equation derived from (6) are 12(2+r) and
−2r3+7r+4
2(5r2+14r+8) . Note that for both r = 0 and r = 1, there is a
unique root and it corresponds to the Nash equilibrium.
In our next result, we give an upper bound on α′.
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Proposition 4 With payoff at least that much of Nash, α′ in any CCE is at most 0.25, that is, the
maximum improvement in the abatement level over Nash is at most 25%.
The proof of Proposition 4 is postponed to the Appendix.
By plotting the two areas defined by (4) and (6) in the (r, α′)-plane, we can find out how much
abatement is compatible with preserving the Nash payoffs, by simply looking for the greatest α′ at each
given r.
We conclude by illustrating our baseline example with (4) and (6).
3.3.1 Illustration with the baseline example
Consider our baseline example with r = 12 . The inequalities become
9
2
α′2 − 2α′ + 11
50
≤ 0 and 13
2
α′2 − 11
4
α′ +
29
100
≤ 0
The first inequality gives α′ ∈ [0.2, 0.244] while the second suggests α′ ∈ [0.2, 0.223]; so the largest
feasible increase in abatement is for α′ = 0.233 (the exact value is 29130 ).
The values of α, β and γ, associated with the (constrained) optimal CCE here are as follows:
α = 0.1115, β = .0135 and γ = .01136. The expression for the lottery in this case can be calculated in
the similar way as in Proposition 3. However, the expression for α′ being slightly complicated, we omit
the presentation of the exact closed form expression for the lottery. We note that the lottery in this
case also will be anti-diagonal as specified in Moulin et al. (2014).
The corresponding expected payoff (for one agent) derived by playing this CCE is ui(L) ≈ 0.11006.
The optimal CCE (total) payoff is piCCE = 2ui(L) ≈ 0.22012, while the Nash equilibrium (total) payoff
is piN ≈ 0.22. We thus have piCCE
piN
≈ 1.00054 (improvement by 0.05%) and qCCE
qN
≈ 1.115, an increase
in abatement of 11.5%, not spectacular, but still significant (more than double the improvement in
abatement compared to payoff-maximising CCE).
The above example provides (almost) the best bound on the improvement (in terms of the abatement
level, with at least the Nash payoff) obtained by a CCE over the Nash levels. To see this, it is enough
to observe that as r increases, the best α′ decreases faster than the improvement brought about by the
increase in r. Similarly, as r decreases, α′ increases but this increase is outweighed by the decrease in r.
4 REMARKS
We have analysed coarse correlated equilibria in a class of two-person symmetric games called the
abatement game; we have characterised the payoff and abatement maximising CCEs and have shown a
very simple way of achieving the maximum level of abatement keeping at least the Nash payoff. Such
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a computation is the first of its kind for coarse correlated equilibria for the abatement game and, this
is why we regard this exercise as an interesting first step towards more sophisticated computations to
understand mediation in general for such games.
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First as a theoretical exercise, our result is perhaps
the first attempt of characterising the benefit from (coarse) correlation in choosing abatement levels by
countries. Second, as the importance of enforcing agreements is an important theme in the environmental
literature, our characterisation suggests why and how a mediator (an independent agency) could be used
for agreements and commitments in abatement games in practice; a mediator can improve upon the
Nash equilibrium outcome by using the optimal CCE which is just a lottery over two outcomes that the
countries would agree to commit to.
There is a huge recent literature in the algorithmic game theory that focuses on the popular ratios,
known as the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) in similar framework. While the
analysis of both PoA and PoS do apply to the situation we study here, the questions we consider in this
paper are different. The existing literature focuses on measuring the loss of efficiency with respect to
one measure only; PoA with respect to one measure (say, utility) is not studied conditional on PoA on
another measure (say, welfare). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide such results in
a small but economically relevant class of games.
Of course, there are quite a few limitations of our results. We have used a quadratic payoff function,
and not any general differentiable concave function. This is not just because it enables us to use the
techniques identified in Moulin et al. (2014); this choice has been justified in the literature (such as
the RICE model in Nordhaus et al. (2000) that tries to set up abatement cost functions fitting real
data). Quadratic approximation is indeed a natural choice for payoffs as shown in the models by Bosetti
et al. (2009), Finus et al. (2005), Klepper et al. (2006). Also, we have worked with the assumption
of identical agents for simplicity. Our characterisation is only for a two-player game. Although it is
unclear how our main result could be generalised in a game with n players, our conjecture is that CCE
can improve upon the Nash equilibrium outcome in an abatement game with n countries. It is of course
true that the efficiency of the results depends heavily upon the number of nations. Consequently, our
paper does not address the important issues of participation decisions and abatement levels.6
Finally, we do not relate our work to the important issues of coalition formation and applications of
coalitional form games, which are now perhaps standard approaches in the literature on the International
Environmental Agreements (IEAs).7 We are also aware of the issues on the structures of (self-enforcing)
IEAs to analyse the interaction among countries and their behaviors to arrive at a final outcome (Barrett
(2003), McGinty (2007), Finus (2008), for example) which are beyond the scope of our current paper.
6Finus (2003) showed that full participation and the efficient outcome is obtained with only two players.
7See, for example, Tulkens (1998) and the references therein.
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5 APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that the expected payoff (for agent 1, say) from any lottery
L ∈ Lsy(R2+) can be written as
u1(L) = aEL[Z1] + aEL[Z2]− bEL[Z21 ]− bEL[Z22 ]− 2bEL[Z1 · Z2]− cEL[Z21 ],
which by symmetry is
u1(L) = 2aEL[Z1]− (2b+ c)EL[Z21 ]− 2bEL[Z1 · Z2]
= 2aα− (2b+ c)β − 2bγ.
We write the expected payoff when agent 1 plays a pure strategy z and agent 2 commits to L, as
u1(z, L
2) = az + aEL[Z2]− bz2 − bEL[Z22 ]− 2bzEL[Z2]− cz2
= (a− 2bα)z − (b+ c)z2 + aα− bβ.
Hence, L is a CCE if and only if
max
z≥0
{(a− 2bα)z − (b+ c)z2}+ aα− bβ ≤ 2aα− (2b+ c)β − 2bγ,
which, after rearranging, gives us the condition in the statement. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the equilibrium condition in Proposition 1. Note that if
a− 2bα < 0⇐⇒ α > a2b , the L.H.S. of that inequality (the maximum over z ≥ 0) is zero; therefore, the
equilibrium condition in Proposition 1 becomes
aα ≥ (b+ c)β + 2bγ = b(β + γ) + cβ + bγ > b(β + γ) ≥ 2bα2,
which is a contradiction. So, we must have α ≤ a2b ; then the L.H.S. of the equilibrium condition is
(a−2bα)2
4(b+c) and the condition is now
(b+ c)β + 2bγ ≤ aα− (a− 2bα)
2
4(b+ c)
= −b
2α2 − a(2b+ c)α+ a24
b+ c
. (7)
We now fix α and solve Step 1 in Lemma 3: we must minimise (2b + c)β + 2bγ in the polytope
Ψ = {(β, γ)|β ≥ γ, β + γ ≥ 2α2} under the additional constraint (7). Note that Ψ is unbounded
from above and bounded from below by the interval [P,Q], where P = (α2, α2) and Q = (2α2, 0). We
distinguish two cases here.
Case 1 (b ≤ c): In this case, the minimum in Ψ of both (2b + c)β + 2bγ and (b + c)β + 2bγ is
achieved at P . Therefore, if P meets (7) it is our optimal pair (β(α), γ(α)); otherwise, there is no CCE
for this choice of α. Now, P meets (7) if and only if (3b+ c)α2 ≤ − b2α2−a(2b+c)α+ a
2
4
b+c , which reduces to
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[a−(2b+ c)α)]2 ≤ 0⇐⇒ α = a2(2b+c) = qNi . By Lemma 1, the optimal CCE L is diagonal (β = γ) and
deterministic (β = α2). It is simply the Nash equilibrium L = δqN of our game.
Case 2 (b > c): Here, the minimum of (b + c)β + 2bγ in Ψ is achieved at Q; so, if Q fails to meet
the constraint (7) there is no hope to meet it anywhere in Ψ. Thus, we must choose α such that
2(b+ c)α2 ≤ −b
2α2 − a(2b+ c)α+ a24
b+ c
⇐⇒ Λ(α) = (3b2 + 4bc+ 2c2)α2 − a(2b+ c)α+ a
2
4
≤ 0 (8)
The discriminant of the right-hand polynomial Λ(α) is a2(b2 − c2); therefore, (8) restricts α to an
interval [α−, α+], between the two positive roots of Λ(α). For such a choice of α, the constraint (7) cuts
a subinterval [R,Q] of [P,Q], where R meets (7) as an equality. Note that R = P only if α = qNi (from
Case 1 and the fact that Λ(qNi ) < 0), otherwise R 6= P . Clearly, R is our optimal choice (β(α), γ(α))
and it solves the system
β + γ = 2α2; (b+ c)β + 2bγ = −b
2α2 − a(2b+ c)α+ a24
b+ c
.
Therefore,
β(α) =
1
b2 − c2
[
b(5b+ 4c)α2 − a(2b+ c)α+ a
2
4
]
and
γ(α) =
1
b2 − c2
[
−(3b2 + 4bc+ 2c2)α2 + a(2b+ c)α− a
2
4
]
.
Now in Step 2 of Lemma 3, we must maximise 2aα − (2b + c)β(α) − 2bγ(α) under the constraints
α ≥ 0 and Λ(α) ≤ 0. Developing this objective function yields the programme
1
b2 − c2 maxα {−b
2(4b+ 5c)α2 + a(2b2 + 2bc− c2)α− a
2c
4
} (9)
under the constraints
α ≥ 0 and Λ(α) = (3b2 + 4bc+ 2c2)α2 − a(2b+ c)α+ a
2
4
≤ 0.
The unconstrained maximum of the objective function is achieved at α˜ = a(2b
2+2bc−c2)
2b2(4b+5c) .
We now show that Λ(α˜) ≤ 0. With the change of variable r = cb , this amounts to
(3 + 4r + 2r2)(2 + 2r − r2)2
4(4 + 5r)2
− (2 + r)(2 + 2r − r
2)
2(4 + 5r)
+
1
4
≤ 0
⇐⇒ 4 + 8r − 5r2 − 12r3 + 3r4 + 4r5 − 2r6 ≥ 0
The above polynomial is 0 at r = 1; it is also easy to check, numerically, that it is non-negative on [0, 1].
The proof of Proposition 2 is now complete if we express α˜, β˜ and γ˜ in terms of r. This is indeed easy
for α˜. One may also verify, using the expression for α˜ that
β˜ = β(α˜) =
1
b2 − c2
[
b(5b+ 4c)α˜2 − a(2b+ c)α˜+ a
2
4
]
=
a2
b2
4 + 8r + r2 − 4r3
4(4 + 5r)2
and
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γ˜ = γ(α˜) =
1
b2 − c2
[
−(3b2 + 4bc+ 2c2)α˜2 + a(2b+ c)α˜− a
2
4
]
=
a2
b2
4 + 8r − r2 − 4r3 + 2r4
4(4 + 5r)2
.
Finally, we construct the optimal CCE L˜. From β˜ + γ˜ = 2α˜2 and Lemma 1iii), we see that L˜ is
an anti-diagonal lottery of the form L˜ = 12δ(z,z′) +
1
2δ(z′,z), where z and z
′ are non-negative numbers
such that z + z′ = 2α˜ and z2 + z′2 = 2β˜. This implies 2zz′ = (2α˜)2 − (2β˜) = 2γ˜, hence z, z′ solve
Z2 − 2α˜Z + γ˜ = 0. The discriminant is α˜2 − γ˜ = β˜ − α˜2 = a2b2 r
2(1−r2)
4(4+5r)2 ; thus, the expressions for z and
z′ follow. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The system of inequalities in Lemma 4 characterise the set of CCEs
of this game; to find the optimal abatement level, we simply need to take the largest solution of this
system. The polynomial has two real roots and the largest one is
α′ =
1
2(2(1 + r)2 + 1)
(2 + r +
√
1− r2) = 1
2(2 + r −√1− r2)
which is clearly below 12 .
We write L∗(r) for the largest abatement CCE at r. The corresponding values of (β′, γ′) are γ′ = 0
and β′ = 2α′2 (to see this, use Figure 2).
γ′
β′
2α′2 11+`∆
Figure 2: Feasible region for abatement maximizing CCEs
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Now, from β′ + γ′ = 2α′2 and Lemma 1iii) above, we observe that L∗(r) is an anti-diagonal lottery
of the form L∗(r) = 12δ(z,z′) +
1
2δ(z′,z), where z and z
′ are non-negative numbers such that z + z′ = 2α′
and z2 + z′2 = 2β′. Hence z, z′ solve Z2 − 2α′Z + γ′ = 0. Since γ′ = 0, we get Z = 2α′, which gives us
the result. 
Proof of Proposition 4. From (4) the upper bound on α′ can be derived as:
α′ ≤ 4 + 3r
2(2 + r)(4 + r)
=
4 + 2r
2(2 + r)(4 + r)
+
r
2(2 + r)(4 + r)
=
2(2 + r)
2(2 + r)(4 + r)
+
r
2(2 + r)(4 + r)
=
1
4 + r
+
r
2(2 + r)(4 + r)
(10)
Right hand side of (10) is a decreasing function in r when r ∈ [0, 1] with a maximum of 0.25 at
r = 0. Since r = 0 is not interesting, the best candidate is 0.25 − , for a very small  > 0. It is not
hard to show that for every choice of  < 0.25 we can find r possibly very close to 0 depending on the
value of  for which (4) and (6) are satisfied. So the maximum improvement in abatement over Nash is
at most 25%. 
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